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Fish pain: An inconvenient truth 







Abstract: Whether fish feel pain is a hot political topic. The consequences of our denial are 
huge given the billions of fish that are slaughtered annually for human consumption. The 
economic costs of changing our commercial fishery harvest practices are also likely to be 
great. Key outlines a structure-function analogy of pain in humans, tries to force that 
template on the rest of the vertebrate kingdom, and fails. His target article has so far elicited 
34 commentaries from scientific experts from a broad range of disciplines; only three of 
these support his position. The broad consensus from the scientific community is that fish 
most likely feel pain and it is time governments display courage enough to act. 
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Key (Key 2016; Key 2016a; Key 2016b) has put forth a structure-function analogy of pain in 
humans and then sets out to discover how far one might take that template when applied to 
the rest of the vertebrate kingdom – well, fish and the odd rodent at any rate. More than 30 
commenters responded to the article, and this clearly shows that this topic is still 
controversial. Of these, three (Rose; Hart; Diggles) support Key’s position. The vast majority 
of commentaries, however, do not, and argue that fish most likely feel pain. Most agree that 
Key’s argument is flawed at best, and his evidence of how pain works in humans is selective, 
simplistic, misleading and outdated (Damasio & Damasio; Merker; Panksepp; Shriver). One 
emerging consensus, however, is that no single line of scientific evidence should over-rule 
any other, and many of the respondents agree that behavioural studies, such as conditioned 
place aversion, are an important component to understanding pain in human and non-
human vertebrates alike. 
 
The primary message from these commentaries is that Key’s argument is fundamentally 
flawed from an evolutionary perspective. He argues (although later denies it) that human 
brain architecture is required to feel pain. The mechanistic approach centres around the role 
of the cortex in human pain. But as Dinets, Brown, Ng and others point out, the human 
cortex has taken on a huge number of roles that once were the domain of other brain 
regions. To suggest that fish don’t feel pain because they lack a cortex, one would also have 
to write-off consciousness (Seth) or indeed any cognitive function that occurs in the human 




cortex. One example of applying this logic would be to conclude that fish are not capable of 
learning either. Clearly this argument is absurd (see Brown et al. 2011; Brown 2015 for 
reviews). Jones, Mather, Striedter, Elwood and Edelman all point out that Key’s approach 
also denies any possibility of convergent evolution, but surprisingly Key accepts that birds 
might provide an example of an independent evolution of a cortex-like structure. Haikonen, 
Manzotti, and Seth take it one step further and suggest that we don’t even understand pain 
in humans yet, and it is far too early to be making judgement calls on other taxa. The role of 
the cortex in human pain is still debated (Stevens; Damasio & Damasio) and is most likely 
not the “on-off switch” for consciousness (Segner). Walters argues that high levels of 
consciousness are not required for pain perception, a view which is consistent with evolution 
being a gradual process rather than occurring as all-or-nothing leaps and with the notion 
that pain is likely an ancient evolutionary trait. 
 
Broom, Sneddon & Leach, and Brown (2015) stated that the separation of nociception from 
the emotional response to it (pain) is old-fashioned and somewhat counter-productive. They 
argue that nociception and pain are part and parcel of the same system, and given the 
important nature of its function (harm avoidance), this system is likely evolutionarily ancient. 
It should hardly be surprising if this system is highly conserved across all vertebrates given 
the associated fitness advantages (Seth; Striedter; Elwood). The fact that the brain regions 
that are responsible vary across taxa is consistent with what we know to be the case with 
many other brain functions. 
 
Diggles claims that the cheerleaders of fish pain perception (and welfare generally) 
intrinsically link pain with welfare. He rightly points out that other measures of welfare are 
available and are far less controversial. Of course the reason we are not talking about these 
other measures here is because they have been the foundation of fish welfare for decades 
(see Huntingford et al. 2006). There is no argument to be had there. The question we are 
addressing here is whether fish feel pain and whether we should include it in our welfare 
framework as we do with other vertebrates. Everyone agrees that current commercial 
harvesting methods are highly stressful for fish. Sadly, we currently lack the political will to 
do anything about it. I hope that given the known relationship between stress levels and filet 
quality, the aquaculture industry will move to limit pain and stress in fishes in the absence of 
any legislation (i.e., self-regulation driven by economics). Unfortunately, Diggles also needs a 
refresher course in vertebrate evolution since he wrongly states that fish are more closely 
related to sharks than they are to mammals and uses that as a basis for likening pain in fish 
to sharks rather than to mammals. It is true that “human-like” nociceptors have not been 
identified in elasmobranchs yet, but that is not to say that they do not exist.  Science 101: 
Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.  
 
Hart rightly points out that there are issues with terminology and that humans are self-
obsessed. Frankly, I think the whole consciousness debate is distracting and is not likely to be 
solved any time soon. We still don’t really know what it is or how it is generated in humans 
let alone in nonhuman animals. Nevertheless, recent papers (e.g., Rey et al. 2015) certainly 
suggest that fish are conscious beings based on any criteria currently in use. Wadiwel 
suggests we should just accept that we cannot experience what other animals (or people) 
are feeling and that the question of pain in fish is hence one of making cautious ethical 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty: the weight of the evidence for and against pain in 




fish, and the weight of the consequences of a false negative (inferring fish do not feel pain 
when in reality they do). 
 
The vast majority of commentaries – experts in a wide spectrum of relevant scientific and 
ethical specialities – accept the accumulating, multi-disciplinary evidence that it is likely that 
fish feel pain; moreover, even in the case of the fence-sitters (including optimistic agnostics), 
it is quite apparent that the precautionary principles apply, given the monumental number 
of fish killed each year in commercial fisheries. Indeed, Jones suggests that such a position is 
not only prudent, but also ethically obligatory. We should not allow conclusions drawn from 
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